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Abstract 
This paper examines whether there is an existence of a long-term contrarian profits at the Middle East (ME) 
market indices. This paper shows strong evidence for the long-term contrarian strategy in the Middle East 
indices. The result of this study demonstrates that the long-term contrarian profits for the Middle East markets 
can’t be explained by two-factor model. In spite of whether winners are smaller or larger than losers, there are 
long-term abnormal profits. Finally, the findings in this paper suggest that the long-term contrarian profits may 
be stronger and more enveloping than is usually understood.  
Keywords: long-term contrarian, Middle East (ME), market indices, two-factor model. 
 
1. Introduction 
In their international indices study of long-term contrarian strategy, Malin and Bornholt (2013) comprehensively 
examine the performances of the long-term abnormal returns to contrarian investment strategies. They reveal 
empirical evidence on the long-term contrarian profits in the international market indices. Their study shows that 
the developed markets results provide statistically significant long-term contrarian profits for all holding months, 
while the developing markets results produce economically important.  
By employing the Malin and Bornholt (2013) methodology, this study aims to investigate whether 
there is a long-term contrarian strategy applied to the Middle East market indices. Within the context, the role of 
two-factor model will be investigated.   
The remainder of the paper is arranged as follows. Next section reviews the previous results in the 
literature while Section 3 presents the sources of the data and discusses the empirical methodology. Section 4 
provides the results for both raw and risk-adjusted returns to the zero investment contrarian strategy, the two-
factor model is also applied as part to the analysis of long-run profitability. Finally, Section 5 concludes the 
paper. 
 
2. Literature Review 
Following DeBondt and Thaler (1985) who documented the long-term contrarian effect, using the same data, 
DeBondt and Thaler (1987) re-examined stocks that earned extreme long-term gains or losses. They constructed 
portfolios of the 50 most extreme losers and 50 most extreme winners. Their finding confirmed the evidence 
documented by DeBondt and Thaler (1985) that the overreaction hypothesis plays an important role in long-term 
return reversals after controlling for both risk and size. Thus, the differences in risk and firm size cannot explain 
the winner-loser effect.  The results also showed that the portfolios of losers outperformed the portfolios of 
winners by about 30% over the following five years. DeBondt and Thaler (1987) examined the seasonal pattern 
of return as well showing a January effect which was related to the reversal effect. In addition, there was a 
negative relationship between the excess returns for the winners and the excess returns prior to December, result 
which was related to the capital gains tax “lock-in” impact. 
At country index level, Richards (1997) investigated the comparable winners-losers reversal in 16 
national markets for the period 1970-1995. Two primary methodologies have been used to assess the risk of a 
contrarian strategy. The first is to measure the covariance of risk and return exposures of the winners and losers 
portfolio. The second is to measure whether loser’s portfolios tend to underperform the winner’s portfolios either 
in recession periods or during large declines in the world index. The analysis confirms the finding of DeBondt 
and Thaler (1985; 1987) that reversals are strongly significant around the 3-year horizon. Consequently, 
abnormal returns have averaged at least 6% annually during the period from 1970-1995. However, the important 
result is that the reversals do not reflect risk differentials. In other words, the difference between test-period 
returns of prior winners and losers are statistically insignificant either in their performance in adverse states of 
the world or in terms of their standard deviations. In addition, the results show that smaller markets are more 
affected by reversals than are larger markets. 
Exploring the source of contrarian profits, Barberis, Shleifer and Vishny (1998) provide an economic 
model of investor sentiment simulated by psychological evidence of how investors form beliefs and expectation 
of future earnings. This model is consistent with Griffin and Tversky’s (1992) idea that concentrates on making 
forecasts. This model produces an underreaction and overreaction to a wide range of parameter values. They 
point out that the three-factor model can explain the overreaction, but not underreaction evidence. In addition, 
Barberis, et al. (1998) presented evidence that the investors can achieve abnormal returns during the 
underreaction and overreaction periods without bearing extra risk, and this is considered a major challenge to the 
efficient market theory. Barberis, et al. (1998) confirmed the finding of DeBondt and Thaler (1985) that long-
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term reversals can be attributed to traders that finally do overreact. Barberis, et al. (1998) and other studies such 
as DeLong, Shleifer, Summers and Waldmann (1993) and Daniel, Hirshleifer and Subrahmanyam (1998) assume 
that this long-term return reversal can be explained by long-term correction after investor overreaction. This 
model relates to both the important behavioral heuristics, known as representativeness bias and conservatism 
bias.  
Representative bias means that investors become too pessimistic (optimistic) about companies with a 
series of bad (good) news. Concentrating on industry news rather than firm-specific news leads investors to 
extrapolate performance too far for the industry as a whole producing long-run reversals in industry returns thus 
supporting Tversky and Kahneman’s (1974) findings. The conservatism bias is also present when investors are 
more conservative in renewing their previous ideas when new industry information arrives, thus, generating 
under-reaction in industry prices to public information. This confirms the phenomenon documented by Edwards 
(1968) that conservatism supports the underreaction evidence.  
Using Conrad and Kaul’s methodology to measure the overreaction hypothesis in seven industrialized 
countries, Baytas and Cakici (1999) assessed the performance of arbitrage portfolios depending on three 
components: size, price and past performance. Baytas and Cakici (1999) supported the finding of Conrad and 
Kaul that the overreaction is not pronounced in the U.S. and that portfolios with (low) high price (outperform) 
underperform the market. On the other hand, their findings showed evidence of overreaction in the majority of 
the countries, except for Canada, where the impact was relatively weak. In general, returns to long-term 
contrarian strategies were significant in other countries. They suggested that some of the long-term price 
reversals observed in loser and winner stocks might be explained by price and size effects. This is because long-
term investment strategies related to size and price provide returns larger than those coupled with past 
performance, and because winners (losers) tend to be high (low) market value firms with high (low) stock price.  
In the Spanish stock market, Forner and Marhuenda ( 2000) analyzed the performance of contrarian 
strategies. The study used techniques suggested by Conrad and Kaul (1993), Ball and Kothari (1989), Chan 
(1988) and DeBondt and Thaler (1985) to assess the returns and the buy-and-hold measures. These techniques 
take into consideration measurement errors. Forner and Marhuenda (2000) showed that the contrarian strategy 
does not produce significant profits thus, providing no evidence of reversal of long-term returns in the Spanish 
market. 
Gaunt (2000) documented the test period performance of all intermediate portfolios on the Australian 
market. He found no reversal performance in the loser portfolios even after adjusting for risk and the difference 
between the test period performance of loser and winner portfolios is not considerable. Gaunt (2000) also finds 
that the price reversal appears when employing monthly portfolio rebalancing and it disappears when using a 
buy and hold strategy, result which is consistent with Brailsford (1992). He shows that abnormal returns in the 
Australian equity market are not based on the lack of liquidity of small firms or the transaction costs related to 
monthly portfolio rebalancing. Most previous studies in the U.S. disagree with this proposition because the 
different research time periods between Australia and U.S. have played an important role in explaining the 
differences between the two countries. Notably, Gaunt’s study extends from 1974 to 1997 while most of the U.S. 
research goes back to 1926.  
Following the DeBondt and Thaler (1985) contrarian method, Balvers, Wu and Gilliland (2000) 
investigated the presence of mean reversion in the indices of 18 countries under different investment strategies. 
Using annual data and a parametric contrarian strategy, they confirmed the finding of Richards (1997) at country 
index level and found that the contrarian strategy provides a 6.1% per year profit. Balvers and Wu (2006) used 
monthly index data and the same a parametric method and confirmed the  Balvers, Wu and Gilliland’s (2000) 
finding by showing positive contrarian profits.  
Using monthly returns for NYSE and AMEX firms only from August 1963 to December 1999, 
Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) investigated the importance of consistency in contrarian strategies with various 
past formation periods. They found that winner consistency is important because the cross-section of returns is 
substantially influenced by the consistency of past winning stocks. This finding is consistent with theories 
proposed by Grinblatt and Han (2001).  
Using Istanbul Stock Exchange data from 1991 to 2000, Bildik and Gulay (2002) investigated the 
momentum and contrarian effects on expected returns based on Jegadeesh and Titman’s (1993) methodology. 
Bildik and Gulay (2002) findings support the overreaction hypothesis that past losers outperform past winners, 
as the average top-losers portfolio returns are higher than the average top-winners portfolio returns by about 
1.14% per month during a 10-year period. Furthermore, they also find that there is a positive relationship 
between the holding period and the difference between the average abnormal return of losers and winners. In 
other words, increasing the holding period leads to an increase in the loser minus winner portfolio average 
abnormal return per month. Their study shows that the month of January influence significantly the contrarian 
profits compared with non-January months concluding that the January effect has a more influence on contrarian 
profits than the length of holding period. Finally, Bildik and Gulay (2002) reveal that the Istanbul Stock 
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Exchange is considered to have a weak-form efficiency because future returns and reversals in prices can be 
predicted by past return data. 
In the UK Arnold and Baker (2005) examined the performance of stocks that have had  extreme 
performance over a previous five year period. Their analysis showed that past losers provide abnormally high 
yearly returns by an average 8.9 percent while past winners provide low yearly returns. This means that the 
market generates biased signals for the managers of those firms, which can potentially influence a range of 
managerial decisions such as the evaluation of the cost of equity and the timing of share issue (Arnold and 
Baker, 2005). Their results are based on seven risk measures. Surprisingly, they show that the loser stocks are 
less risky than winner stocks in all the risk measures In addition, the study finds that return reversals continue 
after separating the size effect, finding that contradicts Clare and Thomas (1995) who show that there is no 
return reversal in the UK after controlling of firm size. However, Arnold and Baker (2005) support the 
overreaction hypothesis where investors’ overreactions generate systematic valuation errors in the stock market.    
In a more recent study, Figelman (2007) investigated the impact of various past stock returns have on 
their future returns. He identified five effects: the intermediate-term momentum effect documented by Jegadeesh 
and Titman (1993), the short-term reversal effect investigated by Jegadeesh (1990), the long-term reversal effect 
reported by De Bond and Thaler (1985) and two new effects (long-term periodicity and intermediate-term 
quarterly periodicity). Figelman (2007) confirmed the finding of DeBondt and Thaler (1987) and also found that 
there was a stronger return reversal in January than in other months. His analysis showed that short-term reversal 
(1-month) was driven by stock-specific phenomenon, not by industries, while intermediate-term momentum 
seemed to be sourced not only by stock-specific dynamics but also by common factors related to industry. The 
long-term reversal effect seemed to be weaker than the other two effects and appeared to be driven by both 
stock-specific dynamics and common industry factors.  
Proposing an alternative rational explanation for the contrarian effect on both U.S. and Hong Kong 
markets, George and Hwang (2007) went further and showed that long-term contrarian can be explained by the 
tax avoidance effect. To test long-term reversals, they measured two behavioral hypotheses with both the capital 
gains lock-in effect and the overreaction hypothesis. Hong Kong was selected for the study as investment income 
is not taxed in this market. George and Hwang (2007) showed that loser reversals are non-existent in January but 
present outside of January, result which is inconsistent with the overreaction hypothesis. Their finding showed 
that the lock-in effect measure plays an important role in predicting winner reversals in the U.S. but the tests 
dependent on the irrational overreaction hypothesis have no predictive power. In Hong Kong, these two 
hypotheses do not predict reversals, thus, long-term reversals are absent in this market. 
In the UK market, Wu and Li (2010) suggested that the long-term return reversals can be explained by 
value-growth characteristics, past performance and tax. In other words, they investigated whether typical rational 
behavior or value-growth characteristics can explain long-term reversals better than past performance. The 
results showed that the value-growth characteristics play a crucial role in explaining long term returns better than 
past performance. Furthermore, the study showed that the capital gain from winners helped to predict reversals 
in the cross-sectional comparison and were able to reflect market price corrections for growth stocks. However, 
the predictive power of winners’ capital gains vanished after controlling for the risk factors employed by Fama 
and French (1996).  
Using risk models such as the CAPM and the three-factor model to attempt to explain momentum and 
contrarian returns, Sehgal and Jain (2011) investigated whether abnormal returns are present in the Indian 
market. They extended DeBond and Thaler’s (1985, 1987) work by having portfolio holding windows which are 
longer than 12 months and portfolio formation periods based on past 2 to 5 years. To avoid short-term 
momentum effects they skipped 12 months between holding windows and portfolio formations. Sehgal and Jain 
(2011) found that the long-run returns cannot be explained by the CAPM and the Fama and French three-factor 
model.  
 
3. Data and Methodology  
This study employs monthly total returns of 11 Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI) Middle East 
indices for the data set. Consistent with the Balvers and Wu (2006), returns are computed from prices converted 
to U.S. dollar to ease the explanation of findings inter-market and since the diverse strategy profits represent the 
findings that would be available to the U.S. dallar-based investor. Monthly total return data has been downloaded 
from Datastream. The study time frame expands from February 1988 to September 2013 with the number of 
observation for an index varying from 308 to 100.   
Table 1 provides descriptive statistics for the monthly return, standard deviation, skewness and 
kurtosis for each index in the Middle East countries. To better understand the performance of the Middle East 
indices, the countries in Table 1 are ranked by descending order. Large variation is reported in Table 1 respect to 
the mean and standard deviation of returns. Turkey has the highest monthly average (over 2% per month), while 
Bahrain has the smallest average at -1.33. The 11 Middle East market countries have an average monthly return 
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of 0.53% and the average standard deviation of 9.03%. For the distribution of returns, skewness and kurtosis 
have a wide range values.  
The purpose of this study is to determine whether the long-term contrarian impact is present at index 
level for Middle East markets. A descriptive of the long-term contrarian strategy is provided next.  
 
3.1 Long-Term Contrarian Strategy 
The long-term contrarian strategy is based on DeBondt and Thaler (1985; 1987) as follows: each month t, 
indices are sorted based on their past J-month returns (J = 36, 48 or 60-month). Every month the long loser (LL) 
portfolio includes that 25% of indices with the lowest past J-month returns, and the long winner (LW) portfolio 
includes the of that 25% of indices with the highest past J-month returns. If the long-term contrarian effect 
applies at the Middle East index level, then indices with returns near to their long-term loser will outperform 
those indices that are farther from their long-term loser. Therefore, the long-term contrarian strategy shorts the 
long-term winner portfolio and longs the long-term loser portfolio to form the long-term loser minus long-term 
winner denoted by (LL-LW) arbitrage portfolio. This study test this holding periods of K = 1, 3, 6, 9 and 12-
month). 
The long-term contrarian strategy uses skipping a one-year gap after the end of the formation period 
according to the Fama and French (1996), Grinblatt and Moskowitz (2004) and Figelman (2007) methodology. 
Fama and French find that skipping one year after the end of formation period generate stronger long-term 
contrarian profits. This finding is consistent with DeBondt and Thaler (1985). 
 
4. Results  
This section examines the results for the long-term contrarian return strategy as well as of raw and risk –adjusted 
results.  
 
4.1 Long-term contrarian returns results 
Table 2 presents results for the selling (LW), buying (LL), and buying-selling (LL-LW) long-term contrarian 
return portfolios for several (J, k) combinations. Table 2 includes the findings for formation period lengths of J = 
36, 48, and 60 months and presents the equal-weighted average monthly portfolio returns for K-month holding 
periods (K = 1, 3, 6, 9, and 12 months) in columns 3 through 7. 
The long-term contrarian results in Table 2 shows clearly that the strategy profits (LL-LW) are 
statistically significant over all K-month holding periods if J = 48 and 60 months. For example, for the four-year 
(48-month) formation period and 6-month holding period (K= 6) case past long-term losers produce an average 
of 2.23 per month whereas past long-term winners provide an average of -0.83% per month over the same 
period. As a result, the difference between the average monthly returns of the LL portfolio and the LW portfolio 
is 3.06% per month (t-stat 3.26), which is statistically significant. In summary, the holding period returns over J 
= 48 and 60 months in Table 2 provide strong evidence of a long-term return contrarian effect at the Middle East 
indices.  
In general, although there are no significant contrarian profits generated for long-formation period of 
36 months, the Table 2 shows significant long-term contrarian LL-LW profits for all J = 48 to 60 months and all 
K. The next section considers the results of the post-holding period long-term contrarian strategy. 
 
4.2 post-holding period returns  
As noted earlier, in the research sample the long portfolios of the long-term contrarian strategy provide 
significant profits over the 48 months leading up to the end of formation period. In this section, this paper uses 
annual event-time returns to investigate how long such contrarian of past performance continues. In the last five 
columns of Table 3 presents event-time returns, together with associated t-statistics that incorporate the Newey-
West (1987) autocorrelation correction for overlapping returns.  
For the long-term contrarian returns strategy in Table 3, all five years have positive LL-LW returns 
except Year 1 and Year 2 over the 36 months. While most Year 5 are not statistically significant and Year 4 are 
weakly significant at the 10% level, their profits are still economically large. Overall, except of Year 1 and Year 
2 over the 36 months, the universally positive long-term contrarian event-time return propose that contrarian 
maintains throughout the first five years post-formation.  
 
The post-formation behaviors of the long-term contrarian return strategy is also illustrated in Figure 1. Figure 1 
shows the post-formation cumulative profits of the long-term contrarian strategy (LL-LW) with J = 60 for the 60 
months following the end of the formation period. The 60 strategy graph shows no signs of slowing down by the 
end of the first 60 post-formation months.   
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4.3 Risk adjustments 
To decide whether the returns of the long-term contrarian strategy could be considered a reward for bearing risk, 
the returns of the long-term contrarian strategy is risk-adjusted employing international two-factor model applied 
by Balvers and Wu (2006) . The two-factor model regression model contains the market factor, and the Value 
minus Growth factor.  
ptt,,, VMG)( εβα ++−+=− vmgpfttmktmktppftpt vRRRR   (1) 
The dependent variable ftpt RR − is the monthly excess return of the strategy portfolio p , and ftR indicates to 
the monthly risk-free rate at time t, represented by the one-month U.S. T-Bill return. The independent variables 
are as follows: )(
, fttmkt RR − is the CRSP value-weighted index’s monthly excess return for month t, while 
VMGt are the monthly return on the MSCI World Value Index minus the return on the MSCI World Growth 
Index at time t. These Middle East indices are downloaded from Datastream. The Coefficients 
vmgpmktp v ,,  and β  are the regression loading corresponding to the two factors. pα or intercept (or simply alpha) 
refers to the risk-adjusted abnormal profits of the portfolios over the estimation period. If pα  is statistically 
significant, this means that there is evidence of abnormal profits. The t-values corresponding to the regression 
coefficients are adjusted for heteroskedasticity employing Whit’s (1980) test.  
Table 4 reports the estimated regression coefficients of the two-factor model and the corresponding 
Whit-adjusted t-values for the buying, selling and buying minus selling portfolios for the long-term contrarian (J 
= 60) strategy with six-month holding periods (K = 6). A column 3 of Table 4 presents the monthly alphas of the 
two-factor model, while the last column lists the adjusted 2R .  
 
The Middle East market results in Table 4 refers that the long-term contrarian strategy’s profitability maintains 
the risk-adjustment process. The risk-adjusted return of the arbitrage portfolio (LL-LW) continues significant at 
3.4% per year (t-stat 3.16).  As might be expected from the raw findings for Middle East markets explained in 
the previous section, the risk-adjusted return of 3.4% for the long-term contrarian is only marginally higher that 
the long-term contrarian returns of 3.32%. Table 4 also reveals that the buying portfolio assist in general in the 
profitability of the strategy, demonstrating significant risk-adjusted profits of 1.9% per year (t-stat 3.51) while 
selling portfolio is -1.5% per year (t-stat -1.49), respectively.   
The important feature is derived from Table 4 is that the long side of long-term contrarian strategy 
(LL) has a significant alpha but the alpha of the short side of long-term contrarian strategy (LW) is not 
significant. Clearly, the contrarian of long-term losers is providing much of this strategy abnormal profit. In 
short, the long-term contrarian result in Table 4 reveals that there is long-term contrarian in Middle East returns 
that cannot be explained by the two-factor model. The result in this paper raises the possibility that the two-
factor model may have difficulty explaining the results of such a study.  
 
5. Conclusion  
Malin and Bornholt (2013) have reported evidence of long-term contrarian at the level of international indices, 
they revealed that there is a statistically significant profit of developed indices and weakly significant profits of 
emerging market indices. This study differs from prior research by examining the evidence of the long-term 
contrarian strategy of all 11 Middle East market indices.  
Using 13 emerging indices, Malin and Bornholt (2013) show that although all the emerging market’s 
long-term contrarian returns are economically significant, none of those returns are statistically significant.  This 
study documents strong evidence of long-term contrarian strategy of 11 Middle East indices over the formation 
period lengths (48 and 60 months). For example, the strongest long-term contrarian return using six-month 
holding periods (J = 60, K = 6) is 3.32% per month. This profit is very large and it is statistically significant (t-
stat 3.09). This finding will motivate the researchers and practitioners to ask what are the reasons behind these 
large profits. Clearly, this long-term contrarian profits presented by this paper regarding the 11 Middle East 
market indices is considerably larger than the long-term contrarian international profits provided by Malin and 
Bornholt (2013). The long-term contrarian profits in the MSCI indices are large. For instance, the long-term 
contrarian strategy generates significant annualized risk-adjusted returns of at least 3.4% in the Middle East 
market indices. 
The results also show that the two-factor model cannot capture the long-term contrarian profits in the 
Middle East market indices. this finding is consistent with result of Malin and Bornholt (2013) that pure 
contrarian profits cannot be explained by two-factor model. This paper contributes to the current body of 
scholarly research that the existence of long-term contrarian profits in Middle East market indices should be of 
interest to professional investors.   
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Table 1: Summary Statistics of Middle East Stock Index Returns 
Country Mean % S.D % Skewness Kurtosis 
Turkey 2.09 16.38 0.81 2.27 
Egypt 1.56 9.95 1.00 4.62 
Lebanon 1.18 9.24 1.31 5.54 
Qatar 0.84 8.74 -0.13 1.66 
Israel 0.68 6.91 -0.19 0.87 
Kuwait 0.37 7.06 -0.16 0.76 
Jordan 0.33 5.21 -0.1 2.05 
Oman 0.19 6.17 -1.31 5.01 
UAE 0.09 11 0.19 1.4 
Sudia Arabia -0.14 11.46 -0.08 -0.62 
Bahrain -1.33 7.18 -0.61 2.99 
AVERAGE 0.53 9.03 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics for the return data of the 11 MSCI Middle East market indices. All 
data are downloaded from their first available months until September 2013, obtained from datastream. Mean 
indicates to the average monthly returns, S.D. indicates to the standard deviation of monthly returns, Skewness 
and Kurtosis refers to the measures of normal distribution.  
 
Table 2: Profitability of Long-Term Contrarian Strategy. 
      
  Holding Month    
Strategy Portfolio K =1 K =3 K =6 K =9 K =12 
36 LL -0.70% -0.94% -0.61% -0.54% -0.37% 
(-0.94) (-1.29) (-0.89) (-0.83) (-0.61) 
LW 0.03% -0.14% -0.43% -0.46% -0.44% 
(0.03) (-0.15) (-0.47) (-0.54) (-0.54) 
LL-LW -0.73% -0.79% -0.18% -0.07% 0.07% 
(-0.59) (-0.7) (-0.16) (-0.07) (0.07) 
48 LL 1.92% 2.00% 2.23% 2.36% 2.39% 
(3.94) (4.05) (4.55) (4.78) (4.68) 
LW -0.79% -0.95% -0.83% -0.65% -0.30% 
(-0.76) (-1.02) (-0.94) (-0.78) (-0.38) 
LL-LW 2.71% 2.95% 3.06% 3.02% 2.69% 
  
  (2.52) (2.98) (3.26) (3.39) (3.16) 
60 LL 2.32% 2.08% 2.04% 2.02% 2.01% 
(3.94) (3.58) (3.62) (3.87) (3.82) 
LW -2.13% -1.68% -1.28% -0.70% -0.16% 
(-1.66) (-1.39) (-1.23) (-0.74) (-0.19) 
LL-LW 4.45% 3.76% 3.32% 2.72% 2.17% 
  
  (3.31) (2.97) (3.09) (2.78) (2.47) 
Table 2 provides the average monthly holding period returns of the selling, buying, and arbitrage 
portfolios of the long-term contrarian strategy for Middle East markets. Portfolios are formed as follows: at the 
beginning of each month t, Middle East indices are sorted depend on their past J-month formation period returns 
for J = 36, 48 and 60 months. The long-run loser portfolio (LL) includes the 25 percent of indices that have the 
lowest returns, while long-run winner portfolio (LW) includes the 25 percent of indices that have the highest 
returns. The strategy LL-LW is based on buying the long-run loser portfolio and selling the long-run winner 
portfolio to be held for K = 1, 3, 6, 9, or 12 months. The t-statistics are provided in parentheses.   
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Table 3: Profitability of Long-Term Contrarian Strategy. 
 Annual Event Time Returns 
Strategy Portfolio Year1 Year 2 Year 3 Year 4 Year 5 
36 LL 7.25% 13.07% 30.01% 25.36% 21.60% 
 (0.95) (1.46) (2.11) (2.3) (1.93) 
 LW 11.98% 17.94% 9.51% 6.84% 11.61% 
 (1.47) (2.05) (1.15) (0.82) (1.59) 
 LL-LW -4.73% -4.87% 20.50% 18.52% 9.99% 
 (-0.55) (-0.49) (2.45) (1.92) (1.14) 
48 LL 14.67% 34.23% 33.89% 30.34% 23.09% 
 
(1.69) (2.39) (2.46) (2.05) (1.89) 
 LW 14.18% 16.29% 9.78% 8.27% 9.02% 
 
(1.66) (1.82) (1.06) (1.1) (1.02) 
 LL-LW 0.49% 17.93% 24.11% 22.07% 14.07% 
  
  (0.06) (2.41) (3.17) (1.62) (1.53) 
60 LL 29.99% 28.75% 31.29% 23.39% 17.94% 
 
(2.83) (2.51) (2.01) (1.78) (1.34) 
 LW 14.20% 13.97% 9.70% 1.14% 18.21% 
 
(1.48) (1.5) (1.35) (0.15) (1.97) 
 LL-LW 20.19% 14.95% 20.36% 18.24% 13.44% 
 
(2.89) (2.54) (2.2) (1.71) (1.36) 
Table 3 provides the average monthly holding period returns of the selling, buying, and arbitrage 
portfolios of the long-term contrarian strategy for Middle East markets. Portfolios are formed as follows: at the 
beginning of each month t, Middle East indices are sorted depend on their past J-month formation period returns 
for J = 36, 48 and 60 months. The long-run loser portfolio (LL) includes the 25 percent of indices that have the 
lowest returns, while long-run winner portfolio (LW) includes the 25 percent of indices that have the highest 
returns. The strategy LL-LW is based on buying the long-run loser portfolio and selling the long-run winner 
portfolio to be held for the first five years (Year 1, Year 2, Year 3, Year 4, or Year 5) following the portfolio 
formation date. The t-statistics are provided in parentheses. The t-statistics in the annual event time depends on 
the Newey-West (1987) adjustment for autocorrelation up to lag 11.  
Figure 1: Cumulative Return of Long-Term Strategy 
 
This graph presents the cumulative returns of the long-term contrarian portfolio LL-LW (with J = 60 
months) using non-overlapping portfolio (K = 1) for the 60-month following the end of the formation period.  
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Table 4: Risk adjusted Long-Term Contrarian Middle East Profits 
Two-Factor Model 
Strategy  Portfolio  
α
 β  V  2R Adj  
Contrarian LL 0.019 0.367 -0.657 5.4% 
(3.51) (3.11) (-2.96) 
LW -0.015 0.638 -0.828 3.6% 
(-1.49) (3.3) (-1.53) 
LL-LW 0.034 -0.271 0.172 -0.6% 
(3.16) (-1.37) (0.33) 
Table 4 provides the two-factor regression results for the monthly returns of the long-term contrarian portfolios 
with J = 60 and K = 6. LW refers to the long-run winner’s portfolio and LL refers to the long-run loser’s 
portfolio (as explained in Table 2). LL-LW is the arbitrage portfolio.  The two-factor regression is as follows: 
ptt,,, VMG)( εβα ++−+=− vmgpfttmktmktppftpt vRRRR  
Where ftpt RR − is the excess return on the MSCI World Market portfolio and tVMG is the value growth 
factor referred by the return on the MSCI World Value Index minus the return on the MSCI World Growth 
Index.  
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